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INTERIM PAYMENTS AND ECONOMIC
DAMAGES TO COMPENSATE PRIVATEPARTY VICTIMS OF HAZARDOUS
RELEASES
JULIE E. STEINER*
There is a gap in tort recovery for many hazardous release victims.
Hazardous spill victims receive different damage compensation based
solely upon the type of hazardous substance released, with oil spill victims
benefitting from a number of statutory damage recovery mechanisms that
victims of other type of hazardous substance releases do not receive.
Specifically, those injured by oil spills receive interim payments and
recover for their economic loss. Yet, many victims injured by non-oil
hazardous spills will incur economic harm but will not receive
compensation because of a prohibition on recovery for economic loss
absent accompanying physical injury or private property damage. That
prohibition on recovery, known as the “pure economic loss rule,” serves
as an effective bar to recovery for most spill victims because hazardous
releases often damage public natural resources (such as water) rather than
private property. This Article articulates normative policy for expanding
interim payments and pure economic loss recovery to a larger class of
private-party hazardous release than just those injured by oil.
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Spills are excellent engines of pure economic loss. They cause
relatively little damage to private property or human life. Instead,
they devastate something un-owned—natural resources, wildlife,
the shores, the environment—and that devastation causes severe
disruption to the surrounding co-dependent economy. The
resulting loss to individuals and businesses is a massive economic
ricochet.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Many victims injured by hazardous releases2 will not be
compensated because of a prohibition on recovering economic loss
absent accompanying physical injury or property damage.3 This
exclusion, known as the “pure economic loss rule,” is broadly applied in
federal maritime and state common law to prohibit recovery for “pure”
economic harm.4 For example, under this rule, if a fishing charterer’s
1. Vernon Valentine Palmer, The Great Spill in the Gulf . . . and a Sea of Pure Economic
Loss: Reflections on the Boundaries of Civil Liability, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 105, 109 (2011)
(italics added) (discussing oil spills).
2. For this Article’s general purpose, a “hazardous” substance broadly references toxic
substances, including oil and natural gas. A “release” references any spilling, leaking,
pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or
disposing into the environment.
3. “Economic loss” is calculable pecuniary loss that can be substantiated by evidence. It
includes lost income or profit, lost earnings capacity, property damage, and personal injury.
It is distinct from non-economic harm like pain and suffering, loss of life’s enjoyment, and
punitive damages. See Karen Beth Clark, Comment, Recovery of Economic Losses Under the
Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention and Response Act: Chapter
21E, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 511, 511–12 (1994).
4. See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 1, at 115. This exclusionary rule is known by a variety of
terms, including the rule in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927), the
exclusionary loss rule, the relational economic loss rule, the stand-alone economic loss rule,
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boat engine is fouled by a chemical spill and the charterer cannot fish,
the charterer can recover the property damage along with consequential
economic loss like business interruption. However, if a chemical spill
fouls the water and not the boat, and the charterer cannot fish because
of a ban on fishing or a decline in the fish population, the charterer’s
loss is “purely” economic, and there is no recovery for the charterer’s
business interruption. In both instances, the charterer has lost income
because of a hazardous release. It is only when the loss is a consequence
of property damage or physical injury that the loss is recoverable.5
Courts and commentators articulate numerous and varied justifications
for the rule, including its bright-line simplicity, the fact that it limits what
would otherwise be open-ended liability, its ability to avert fraudulent
claims, and the fact that it maintains liability in scale with the gravity of
the defendant’s conduct.6
The pure economic loss rule operates as a complete bar to recovery
for many release victims.7 Hazardous spills often do not cause physical
harm or private property damage because the injury occurs instead to
publicly owned resources like water bodies, air, wildlife, and other
natural resources.8 When the injury is to a public resource, the pure
economic loss rule operates to bar victim recovery.9 The plight of
release victims is compounded because, even when economic loss is
legally recoverable as a consequence of physical injury or property

and the general economic loss no liability doctrine. Commentators are divided on whether it
is truly a single rule, a series of rules, or a legal policy against pure economic loss recovery.
Id. at 115, 119.
5. Andrew B. Davis, Note, Pure Economic Loss Claims Under the Oil Pollution Act:
Combining Policy and Congressional Intent, 45 COLUM. J.L & SOC. PROBS. 1, 5 (2011).
6. See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 1, at 109–10, 115, 118 & n.59. While this Article does not
attempt to provide a comprehensive compilation of the justifications for the pure economic
loss rule, a particularly thoughtful review can be found at Anita Bernstein, Keep it Simple: An
Explanation of the Rule of No Recovery for Pure Economic Loss, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 773
(2006).
7. Ronen Perry, The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and the Limits of Civil Liability, 86
WASH. L. REV. 1, 10 (2011) (listing all those who are affected by oil spills and then noting
that “American courts have consistently denied recovery for this kind of loss”).
8. See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 1, at 109 (identifying the fact that oil spills often damage
un-owned public resources and thus the economic loss rule effectively shields polluters from
oil spill liability); Perry, supra note 7, at 10.
9. Palmer, supra note 1, at 116 (discussing how oil spills have a limited impact on private
property).
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damage, victims face a problematic time lag between injury and claims
payment.10
Three notable exceptions exist that enable hazardous release victims
to recover certain types of pure economic loss. The first is a general
exception for commercial fisherman that developed in admiralty and
common law.11 The second is an exception in some jurisdictions for
family members.12 The third exception is for oil release victims.13
The disparity in compensation for victims of oil and non-oil
hazardous substance releases is illustrated by comparing outcomes in
the following two scenarios. In January 2014, a West Virginia coal
company’s 48,000-gallon storage tank ruptured, leaking approximately
10,000 gallons of the coal wash 4-Methylcyclohexane methanol and
propylene glycol phenyl ether into the nearby Elk River, ultimately
contaminating the public water supply.14
Administrators quickly
declared a state of emergency, and over 300,000 residents were banned
from using water for all purposes except to flush toilets or for firefighting purposes.15 The injury was immediate.16 Among many

10. Delayed compensation is not particular to hazardous release victims. Hazardous
spills, however, have long been the subject of particular public legislative focus. As discussed
in Part II, there are policy reasons to expedite compensation for victims of hazardous
releases. While this Article’s focus is on hazardous substance releases, it is certainly possible
that many of the policy arguments about interim damages might inform a discussion about
expedited claims processing in other contexts.
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See, e.g., Coral Davenport & Ashley Southall, Critics Say Chemical Spill Highlights
Lax West Virginia Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2014, at A8 (describing release of 4methylcyclohexane methanol from Freedom River Industries, Inc.’s, Elk River storage
facility); Ashley Southall, Chemical Spill Fouls Water in West Virginia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10,
2014, at A14. On January 17, 2014, eight days after the leak, the company filed for
bankruptcy. See, e.g., Tom Hals, Company in West Virginia Chemical Spill Files for
Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Jan. 17, 2014, 5:38 PM), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/20
14/01/17/freedomindustries-bankrutpcy-idUSL2N0KR1OA20140117, archived at http://perma
.cc/DQX4-3825.
15. W. VA. BUREAU FOR PUB. HEALTH & THE AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES
DISEASE REGISTRY, ELK RIVER CHEMICAL SPILL HEALTH EFFECTS: FINDINGS OF
EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT RECORD REVIEW (2014), available at http://www.dhhr.wv.gov/N
ews/chemical-spill/Documents/ElkRiverMedicalRecordSummary.pdf, archived at http://perm
a.cc/CX27-TJM9; Trip Gabriel, Thousands Without Water After Spill in West Virginia, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2014, at A9. A “do not use” order for the public water supply went into effect
on January 9, 2014, and was gradually lifted beginning on January 13, 2014. Michael Wines,
Chemical Company Owners Are Charged in Spill that Tainted West Virginia Water, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2014, at A25; see also Davenport & Southall, supra note 14, at A8.
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categories of injury, businesses and schools had to shut their doors.17
Some victims suffered health effects.18 Residents had to arrange for
alternative water.19 One early study estimated that the chemical spill
cost the West Virginia economy $19 million a day for each business day
the water ban was in effect.20 These are but a few examples of the
economic loss experienced by the 2014 West Virginia Elk River release
victims.
In the second situation, an oil company’s 18,000-foot deep
exploratory deep oil well located in the Gulf of Mexico ruptured,
ultimately leading to a three-month long oil leak of approximately 4.9
million barrels of crude.21 As with the release in West Virginia, the
economic injury was immediate. A ban on Gulf fishing affected not
16. See, e.g., Gabriel, supra note 15.
17. Jonathan Matisse, Businesses Incur Losses After Chemical Spill, WASH. TIMES (May
11, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/may/10/businesses-incur-losses-after-c
hemical-spill/?page=all, archived at http://perma.cc/JZ9L-VN84; Evan Osnos, Chemical
Valley, NEW YORKER, Apr. 7, 2014, at 38, 41.
18. W. VA. BUREAU FOR PUB. HEALTH & THE AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES
DISEASE REGISTRY, supra note 15. Approximately 369 people were treated at emergency
departments complaining of symptoms relating to exposure to contaminated water. Id. Of
those, 13 were hospitalized and 356 were treated in the emergency room and released. Id.
19. Matisse, supra note 17 (describing business loss, cost of buying alternative water,
and lack of insurance and public relief); Osnos, supra note 17, at 41 (describing residents
fighting each other in an attempt to secure waning supplies of water, and efforts to drive
eighty miles to purchase water).
20. See Clark Davis, Businesses Lose $61 Million Because of Elk River Spill, W. VA.
PUB. BROADCASTING (Feb. 13, 2014), http://wvpublic.org/post/businesses-lose-61-millionbecause-elk-river-spill, archived at http://perma.cc/GN8F-7KFV (describing Marshall
University Center for Business and Economic Research findings estimating that in the four
business days immediately following the ban—two business days and two weekend days—the
impact was about $61 million, affecting about 75,000 workers each day, or about 41% of the
area work force, and lower-wage service-producing workers were more affected than those in
higher wage industries).
21. See MARCIA MCNUTT ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ASSESSMENT OF
FLOW RATE ESTIMATES FOR THE DEEPWATER HORIZON/MACONDO WELL OIL SPILL
(2011), available at http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfi
le&PageID=237763; Marcia K. McNutt et al., Review of Flow Rate Estimates of the
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 20260 (2012) (quantifying a
discharge rate of 50,000–70,000 barrels a day, totaling nearly 5 million barrels of oil released
from the well between April 20 and July 15, 2010, when the leak was capped). The oil was
discharged along with copious amounts of dispersants—about 1.8 million gallons total—in an
attempt to break up the oil and, theoretically, make it easier for microorganisms to digest.
See PAUL F. ZUKUNFT, OPERATIONAL SCIENCE ADVISORY TEAM (OSAT) UNIFIED AREA
COMMAND, SUMMARY REPORT FOR SUB-SEA AND SUB-SURFACE OIL AND DISPERSANT
DETECTION: SAMPLING AND MONITORING 6 (2010), available at http://www.restorethegulf.g
ov/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/OSAT_Report_FINAL_17DEC.pdf.
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only commercial fisherman but also individuals who depended upon the
Gulf resources for both sustenance and livelihood.22 Gulf tourism
plummeted.23 Many businesses lost earnings, laid workers off, or shut
their doors entirely.24 The anxiety and stigma associated with the oil
contamination had ripple effects that arguably led to a decline in
seafood consumption and a travel aversion to the Gulf region, affecting
numerous individuals and businesses that persisted even after the
moratorium ceased.25 Those are just a few examples of the economic
loss experienced by the 2010 BP Gulf oil spill victims.
The two scenarios are similar. In both instances victims lost business
income, profit, and out-of-pocket expense. Yet in the Gulf, victims had
the ability not only to recover compensation for pure economic loss but
also to recover it rapidly. In fact, $2.4 billion was paid to 170,000
individuals and businesses through its interim claims processing within
three months of the Gulf spill.26 Compare that with the fact that most
West Virginia victims might not receive any compensation.27 Even
those who can recover will experience delay before their claims are
settled or adjudicated.28 In the meantime, they carry the cost of their
harm.
This Article endeavors to articulate normative policy for expanding
interim payments and pure economic damages to a larger class of
private-party hazardous release victims than commercial fishermen,
family members, or those injured by oil. Interim payments refer to prefinal and partial payments of a claimant’s ultimate damage award.

22. See Palmer, supra note 1, at 109, 116 n.49 (after $1.5 billion in funds were disbursed
to claimants in Louisiana, 99% of the claims filed were for economic damage while only 1%
was for property damage); Davis, supra note 5, at 2.
23. Maureen Mackey, BP Oil Spill: Gulf Tourism Takes a Huge Hit, FISCAL TIMES
(Jun. 24, 2010), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2010/06/24/BP-Oil-Spill-Gulf-TourismTakes-a-Huge-Hit, archived at http://perma.cc/K667-2UR9.
24. Davis, supra note 5, at 2–3.
25. Id. at 2.
26. KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT: FAIR COMPENSATION AFTER
TRAGEDY AND FINANCIAL UPHEAVAL 141 (2012). Compare that with the fact that, at the
same time, no litigant had received payment in court. That is not to say that there were not
issues with the operation of the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF); however, under
extraordinary time and public pressure, the GCCF facilitated large-scale, rapid compensation
to many victims. Additional detail about the GCCF interim claims process experience is
provided in Part IV.B.
27. See Hals, supra note 14.
28. Five months after the West Virginia spill those victims had not yet received
compensation. See Matisse, supra note 17, at 1.
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Approximately 25,000 to 35,000 chemical incidents occur each year.29
Releases often damage un-owned public resources.30 Thus, as a
practical matter many release victims will incur only pure economic
harm and will be barred from recovery. The exceptions that exist for
commercial fisherman, family members, and oil spill victims are unduly
restrictive and create compensation inequity for otherwise similarly
situated victims of other types of hazardous spills.31
Moreover, the delay between the injury and any eventual
compensation award further harms release victims.32 Delay affects a
victim’s financial stability, causes stress, and can detour a victim’s funds
away from supporting sound health and lifestyle choices. The time lag
generally favors the polluter. The threat of delayed compensation puts
pressure on the victims to settle their claims for less than full value in
order to achieve more rapid payment and permits the polluter to at least
temporarily shift the cost of harm to the victim.33 Interim payments are
a particularly beneficial remedy to counteract delay-related harm.34 The
expedited damages, moreover, better compensate populations that are
already disproportionately impacted by the negative externalities of
pollution-related activities.
Interim and economic damage payments invoke a number of
concerns about unlimited liability and over-deterrence, procedural and
substantive due process, and judicial economy.35 Those concerns raise
important issues that need to be addressed by structuring a system
29. U.S DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL TOXIC SUBSTANCE
INCIDENTS PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 8 (2011).
30. Palmer, supra note 1, at 109.
31. Herbert Bernstein, Civil Liability for Pure Economic Loss Under American Tort
Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 111, 113 (Supp. 1998); John C.P. Goldberg, Liability for Economic
Loss in Connection with the Deepwater Horizon Spill, 30 MISS. C. L. REV. 335, 337 (2011);
Note, The Limits of Liability: Can Alaska Oil Spill Victims Recover Pure Economic Loss?, 10
ALASKA L. REV. 87, 102 (1993).
32. See Benjamin R. Civiletti, Zeroing in on the Real Litigation Crisis: Irrational Justice,
Needless Delays, Excessive Costs, 46 MD. L. REV. 40, 40, 48 (1986) (“The real [civil justice
system] crisis can be seen from the fact that injured parties carry the burden of their injury
under appalling circumstances for extreme periods of time and at staggering economic and
human costs. . . . [¶] The delay and cost involved in the tort litigation system, in themselves,
supply ample justification for civil justice reforms . . . . Reforms are needed to assure
reasonable, timely compensation, to preserve access to the courts for injured parties, and to
discourage wrongful conduct.”).
33. See id. at 44.
34. See id. at 46–47.
35. See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk, Interim Attorney’s Fee Awards Against the Federal
Government, 68 N.C. L. REV. 117, 121–25 (1990); Davis, supra note 5, at 8–9.
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designed to facilitate interim payments and pure economic damages
while minimizing procedural and substantive due process impact, that
adopts scope-limiting rules to reduce concerns about unlimited liability,
and that is judicially manageable.
This Article is comprised of three parts. Part II describes the type of
economic damages private victims receive and the timing of when those
victims receive compensation. It also evaluates why the current
recovery system is inadequate to compensate private-party victims of
hazardous releases. Part III analyzes the benefits of and concerns with
pure economic damage compensation. Part IV addresses the benefits of
and concerns with interim payments. Understanding and responding to
these concerns helps shape an approach that best balances competing
interests.
II. ECONOMIC DAMAGES FOR PRIVATE-PARTY HAZARDOUS
RELEASE VICTIMS
Hazardous releases leave victims in a precarious position. Victims
are in immediate need of funds to address the consequences.36 While
some victims suffer physical harm to person or property, many do not.37
However, most will incur some degree of economic harm that might
include lost earnings or job opportunities.38 Many release victims have
no legal recourse to recover these damages.39 Even for damages that are
compensable, the long time delay between injury and claims payment
can be costly and anxiety-provoking.40
This Section addresses the question of what economic damages spill
victims are entitled to recover and when they receive compensation.
Part A addresses private-party recovery for economic loss, Part B
addresses when release victims receive interim damages, and Part C
describes the role of insurance to compensate victims.

36. See, e.g., Lt. Col. Millard, Disaster Claims—Advance and Emergency Partial
Payments, ARMY LAW., June 1995, at 63.
37. See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 1, at 109.
38. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 3, at 511–12.
39. See id. at 513.
40. By way of but one example, the Exxon Valdez claimants had to wait nearly twenty
years to receive their damage award. See J. Steven Picou, When the Solution Becomes the
Problem: The Impacts of Adversarial Litigation on Survivors of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 7
U. ST. THOMAS L. REV. 68, 73–75 (2009).
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A. The Scope of Economic Damage Recovery
The pure economic loss rule took hold in German, English, and
English common-law-influenced systems around the late nineteenth
century.41 In 1927, it was adopted into admiralty law in Robins Dry
Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint.42
The Robins Dry Dock case involved damage to a boat that was
under time charter.43 After the owners brought the boat in for routine
docking, the dry dock operators negligently damaged the boat’s
propeller.44 The time charterer plaintiffs brought action to recover for
the lost use of the boat while the propeller damage was being repaired.45
The Court held that the plaintiffs could not recover because, as time
charterers, they were not the boat owners and therefore had not
personally suffered property damage.46 Put another way, they had
suffered non-compensable pure economic loss, not compensable loss
that was a consequence of damage to their personal property.
What is now known as the “Rule in Robins Dry Dock” is
coterminous with the preexisting common law “pure economic loss
rule.” Case law involving hazardous releases has overwhelmingly
embraced this exclusionary recovery rule, normalizing as a general legal
matter a broad bar to recovering for economic loss that is not
accompanied by physical injury or personal property damage.47
The pure economic loss rule is so effective a recovery bar that an
exception developed for commercial fisherman and other users of the
sea.48 This “commercial fisherman exception” has been justified on a
41. Palmer, supra note 1, at 114.
42. 275 U.S. 303 (1927); Palmer, supra note 1, at 116–19 (discussing maritime law’s
adoption of the rule).
43. 275 U.S. at 307.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 308–09.
47. See, e.g., Lloyd’s Leasing Ltd. v. Conoco, 868 F.2d 1447, 1448–49 (5th Cir. 1989)
(denying pure economic loss claims to over 375 claimants in oil spill in Calcasieu River Bar
Channel); Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985) (denying
various claimants including shipping interests, marine and boat rental operators, seafood
enterprises, and tackle and bait shops pure economic loss claims in PCP spill into Mississippi
River Gulf); Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974) (denying pure economic
loss claims for 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill). But see Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Co., 523 F. Supp.
975 (E.D. Va. 1981) (permitting charter boat owners, marinas, and tackle and bait operators
to maintain suit for pure economic loss while dismissing claims of seafood wholesalers,
retailers, processors, distributors, and restaurateurs).
48. Note, supra note 31, at 102.
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variety of grounds, most frequently on the basis of a special relationship
between the tortfeasor and “fisherman and other users of the sea”
requiring the tortfeasor to “refrain from negligent conduct . . . which . . .
reasonably and foreseeably could have been anticipated to cause a
diminution in the aquatic life.”49 Thus, fisherman, crabbers, oystermen,
and shrimpers have been compensated their pure economic loss under
this “commercial fisherman” exception.50
In some jurisdictions, another exception to the pure economic loss
rule is given to family members to compensate them for lost familial
services when their family member was negligently injured or killed.51
The underlying theory is that the family member suffered a violation of
a “quasi-property right” or was in a special relationship status with the
victim and they consequently suffered economic harm.52
Legislatures have also expanded pure economic loss recovery to
private-party oil spill claimants.53 For example, the 1990 Oil Spill Act
(OPA) expanded oil release liability to permit private-party recovery of
“[d]amages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity
due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal
property, or natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any
claimant.”54 As a result of OPA’s express language and legislative

49. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 568) (internal quotation
mark omitted).
50. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 479–80, 508 n.21 (2008)
(recognizing a limited exception for pure economic loss by commercial fisherman); Alaska
Native Class v. Exxon Corp., 104 F.3d 1196, 1197–98 (9th Cir. 1997) (granting pure economic
loss to native Alaskans who lost fishing resources); M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1049–50
(granting limited exception for pure economic loss recovery for commercial fisherman,
oystermen, shrimpers, and crabbers who used the embargoed water); Union Oil, 501 F.2d at
570 (granting limited exception for pure economic loss recovery for commercial fisherman);
see also Perry, supra note 7, at 22–23.
51. Bernstein, supra note 31, at 113.
52. Id. at 113–14.
53. See Goldberg, supra note 31, at 337.
54. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E) (2012). OPA also codifies private recovery for economic
loss accompanied by physical injury by including “[d]amages for injury to, or economic losses
resulting from destruction of, real or personal property, which shall be recoverable by a
claimant who owns or leases that property” and provides a right of recovery for economic loss
associated with lost subsistence use by including “[d]amages for loss of subsistence use of
natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant who so uses natural resources
which have been injured, destroyed or lost, without regard to the ownership or management
of the resources.” Id. § 2702(b)(2)(B)–(C).
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history, courts now award pure economic damages for victims of oil
spills.55
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA) also
imposes strict liability for pure economic loss associated with oil
releases.56 TAPAA expands oil release liability to permit recovery to
“all damaged parties, public or private, without regard to fault for such
damages, and without regard to ownership of any affected lands,
structures, fish, wildlife, or biotic or other natural resources relied upon
by Alaska Natives, Native organizations, or others for subsistence or
economic purposes.”57 TAPAA is limited to oil releases stemming from
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System.58
A small number of states have enacted legislation to include private
recovery for pure economic loss.59 While federal victim compensation
bills have periodically been introduced in the Legislature, they have not
met with success.
For example, Congress considered victim
compensation legislation when passing Superfund; however, the issue
was too politically controversial and it was ultimately deleted from the
bill.60
A few courts have expanded recovery for pure economic loss to
cover claimants in chemical spill cases.61 Cases such as these, although a
rarity, can serve as the basis for release litigants to argue that the
common or maritime law should be expanded to permit pure economic
recovery for hazardous substance releases.

55. See, e.g., S. Port Marine, LLC v. Gulf Oil Ltd. P’ship, 234 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 2000);
Secko Energy, Inc. v. M/V Margaret Chouest, 820 F. Supp. 1008, 1014–15 (E.D. La. 1993).
56. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651–1656 (2012).
57. Id. § 1653(a)(1).
58. Id. §§ 1652(a), 1653(a).
59. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.03.822–.824 (2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.05
(West 2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-12.3-4 (2007).
60. Theodore L. Garrett, Compensating Victims of Toxic Substances: Issues Concerning
Proposed Federal Legislation, 13 ENV. L. REP. 10172, 10172 (1983).
61. See Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Co., 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981) (allowing limited
category of claimants to bring action for pure economic loss caused by Kepone spill into
Chesapeake Bay); People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107 (N.J.
1985) (allowing airline to bring action for pure economic loss after chemical spill from tank
car caused evacuation of its office and lost profits).
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B. The Timing of Damages: Interim Payments
Interim payments are granted when a claimant makes an evidentiary
showing of entitlement to a damage award.62 Because they are partial
and pre-final, interim payments are designed to provide victims with
expeditious recovery.63 While it is possible that a payment may satisfy
the full value of a particular claim, interim payments are typically partial
payments and are not designed to compromise the claimant’s ability to
pursue the entire outstanding value of a claim to which a victim may be
entitled.64 A claimant’s final judgment is reduced by the amount of any
interim payments received.65
Interim damage payments are available to oil release victims. At the
same time that Congress provided a statutory strict liability mechanism
to recover pure economic loss in OPA, Congress also provided for
interim damage payments to timely recover that loss.66 OPA requires a
responsible party to establish a procedure for handling short-term
damage claims.67 Responsible parties must advertise the available
claims procedures to potential claimants no later than fifteen days after
they are designated a responsible party and continue that advertisement
for no less than thirty days.68
Courts will likely refrain from granting interim relief absent
statutory authority like that contained in OPA.69 Court-ordered
monetary interim relief is exceptional. In the select instances where it is
granted, it is typically limited to attorney fees, litigation costs, or both.
For example, courts have sparingly awarded interim attorney fees and
litigation costs when authorized by fee shifting statutes, in contexts such
as civil rights,70 freedom of information,71 divorce,72 bankruptcy,73 and

62. See 33 U.S.C. § 2705(a) (2012); Hanrahan v. Hampton 446 U.S. 754, 758 (1980).
63. See Millard, supra note 36, at 63–64.
64. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2705(a), 2713(d), 2715(b)(2).
65. See id. § 2713(d).
66. See id. § 2705.
67. Id. § 2705(a) (“The responsible party shall establish a procedure for the payment or
settlement of claims for interim, short-term damages.”); see infra Part IV for additional detail
about the structure of OPA’s interim payment system.
68. 33 U.S.C. § 2714(b)(1).
69. See Palmer, supra note 1, at 129.
70. See, e.g., Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 & n.4 (1980) (holding § 1988
authorized interim fee awards); Brown v. Marsh, 707 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1989) (permitting
interim attorney’s fee awards against the United States in litigation under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act).
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emergency school aid litigation.74 Even in those situations, they are
granted in exceptional circumstances when justified for equitable
reasons, such as leveling the litigation playing field or providing funds to
facilitate potentially meritorious lawsuits that would not otherwise be
brought.75 Courts have also recognized the authority of arbitral
tribunals to issue interim awards under such statutes as the Federal
Arbitration Act,76 the Military Personnel and Civilian Employees
Claims Act,77 and the Military Claims Act.78
Interestingly, other countries have more comfort with, and have
established procedures for, interim damage awards. For example, in
England and Wales, interim payment may be awarded in catastrophic
injury cases.79 A claimant needs to show that the interim payment is a
reasonable proportion of the damages likely to be awarded to obtain

71. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (A)(4)(E) (2012); 37A AM. JUR. 2D Freedom of Information Acts
§§ 567, 574 (2013).
72. See, e.g., Young v. Young, 898 So. 2d 1076, 1077 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (granting
interim fees “to ensure that both parties to a dissolution case have similar access to counsel
and that neither has an unfair ability to obtain legal assistance”); see also Kasm v. Kasm, 933
So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
73. Cf., e.g., In re Unitcast, Inc., 219 B.R. 741 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998).
74. See, e.g., Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 723–24 (1974) (holding
Emergency School Aid Act allowed interim fee awards); Rosenfeld v. United States, 859 F.2d
717, 724 (9th Cir. 1988) (same).
75. See, e.g., Young, 898 So. 2d at 1077; Brown, 707 F. Supp. at 23–24.
76. James M. Gaitis, The Federal Arbitration Act: Risks and Incongruities Relating to the
Issuance of Interim and Partial Awards In Domestic and International Arbitrations, 16 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 9 (2005) (“[E]ven in the absence of a statutory provision specifically
authorizing arbitral tribunals to issue interim and partial awards that are final in nature,
federal courts have long acknowledged that tribunals have such authority.”). Congress
indirectly codified this authority in the 1988 amendments to the FAA. Id.
77. See Millard, supra note 36, at 63–64 (discussing implementing regulations to the
Military Personnel and Civilian Employees Claims Act authorizing emergency partial
payments for damage to or loss of personal property incident to natural or manmade disasters
caused by “fire, flood, hurricane or other unusual occurrences”).
78. See id. at 65 (discussing authorization in the Military Claims Act for advance partial
payments to alleviate immediate hardship in situations where the victim or the victim’s family
have an “immediate need for food, clothing, shelter, medical, burial expense or other
necessities”).
79. See Gordon Exall, Interim Payments and the Seriously Injured Claimant: Somewhere
to Live or Down at EELES?, CIV. LITIG. BRIEF (June 24, 2013), http://civillitigationbrief.wor
dpress.com/2013/06/24/interim-payments-and-the-seriously-injured-claimant-somewhere-to-li
ve-or-down-at-eeles/, archived at http://perma.cc/XBQ7-RJ47.
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interim payment.80 Interim payment is not restricted to past losses but
may also include future loss.81
C. The Availability of Public and Private Insurance
Currently, insurance is the available compensation mechanism for
most private spill victims’ pure economic loss. Some commentators
argue that excluding liability is a more efficient means of loss spreading
because it provides victims with incentives to self-protect against loss at
a lower administrative cost than shifting liability to the polluter.82
Potential victims who are vulnerable to harm can purchase first-party
insurance, like business interruption coverage, to cover eventual loss.83
Governments also may provide public, or social, insurance.84
However, insurance is not a comprehensive gap filler. First-party
insurance may not be available or widely obtained.85 The extent to
which potential victims are in fact availing themselves of insurance is
uncertain. Potential victims might not purchase advance protection
because they are inattentive to their needs, fail to appreciate their risk,
choose to ignore their risk, or take a chance that they will not be
injured.86 Only those most aware of their potential risk, in a financial
position to insure against it, and desirous of taking advanced protective
measures will be motivated to preemptively purchase insurance.87 When
there is no insurance, the cost of pollution is either born by the victim or
publicly absorbed through social insurance, the costs of which are
diffusely spread to the tax base.88

80. See Cobham Hire Services Ltd. v. Eeles, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 204, [2], [2010] 1
W.L.R. 409 (Eng.).
81. See, e.g., Harris v. Roy, [2010] QBD (Eng.) (rejecting the argument that interim
payment was confined to past loss); see also, e.g., Szatmari v. Oxford Radcliffe Hospitals NHS
Trusts, [2012] EWHC (QB) 1339 (Eng.) (interim payments to fund housing or vehicular
adaptations to address resulting disabilities); Kirby v. Ashford & St. Peters Hospital NHS
Trust, [2011] EWHC (QB) 624 (Eng.); Exall, supra note 79.
82. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 7, at 20.
83. See Fleming James, Jr., Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by
Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43, 52 (1972).
84. Id.
85. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Roles of Government in Compensating Disaster Victims,
ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Jan. 26, 2007, at 6, http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi
?article=1093&context=ils, archived at http://perma.cc/K3PT-VETJ.
86. Id. at 8.
87. See id.
88. See James, supra note 83, at 53.
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III. PURE ECONOMIC DAMAGES: BENEFITS AND CONCERNS
Pure economic damages advance a number of tort goals. They
provide more comprehensive victim compensation; promote
environmental justice, including distributive, procedural, corrective, and
social justice; and deter tortious behavior. A proper structure advances
these goals while responding to concerns about unlimited liability and
judicial manageability.
A. Compensation Benefits
As discussed in Part II, there is a gap in tort coverage for many
hazardous release victims. Often, releases damage un-owned resources
like water, air, wildlife, and other natural resources, and the resulting
harm is of a purely economic nature.89 Because common and maritime
law routinely denies recovery in such situations—and because the
existing exceptions for fisherman, family members, and victims of oil
releases are unduly restrictive—problematic gaps in compensation
remain for many other hazardous release victims. Expanding liability
for pure economic damages serves to better fill in those gaps.
Victim compensation, or full and fair redress of civil legal wrongs, is
one of the essential goals of tort law.90 Pure economic damage recovery
provides more complete and fair compensation. Because spills are
indeed “excellent engines of pure economic loss,” permitting recovery
better responds to the type of harm many release victims will
experience.91
B. Environmental Justice Benefits
In a variety of ways, expanding hazardous release liability to cover
pure economic loss provides a more environmentally just compensation
system. While there is no uniformly agreed upon definition of
“environmental justice,” the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
defines it as “the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all
people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect
to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental

89. Palmer, supra note 1, at 109.
90. John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full Compensation,
55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 435 (2006).
91. See Palmer, supra note 1, at 109 (discussing oil spills).
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laws, regulations, and policies.”92 Fair treatment, in turn, requires that
“no group of people should bear a disproportionate share of the
negative environmental consequences resulting from industrial,
governmental and commercial operations or policies.”93
To be
“meaningfully involved” means that people must “have an opportunity
to participate in decisions about activities that may affect their
environment and/or health,” their involvement must be such that it can
influence regulatory decisions, their concerns must be considered by
decision makers, and decision makers must facilitate the involvement of
potential victims.94 Robert R. Kuehn proposes an approach to
environmental justice issues that evaluates how well they achieve
distributive justice, procedural justice, corrective justice, and social
justice.95 These justice theories are all components of fair and
meaningful environmental justice.96
Framed through the lens of distributive justice, enlarging the class of
victims entitled to pure economic recovery redistributes the risk of
hazardous substance releases, providing a more equitable distribution
among the parties.97 This risk redistribution is particularly beneficial for
socioeconomically disadvantaged populations and communities of
color.98 Research focusing on the 2010 Gulf oil spill reflects that there
were documented disproportionate impacts that the Gulf spill had on
such populations and existing legal mechanisms were insufficient to
protect vulnerable populations.99 Expanding pure economic damages to
92. Basic Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/enviro
nmentaljustice/basics/ejbackground.html (last updated May 24, 2012), archived at http://perm
a.cc/5VL8-279Z.
93. Id.
94. Id. See Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10681 (2000) for an interesting history and discussion of “environmental justice”
definitions.
95. Kuehn, supra note 94.
96. Id.
97. For purposes of environmental justice, distributive justice means the right to “the
same distribution of goods and opportunities as anyone else has or is given” and includes not
only the equitable distribution of the burdens of polluting activities (i.e., a shifting or
redistribution of risks) but also a lowering of risks. Id. at 10683–84. Distributive justice
focuses on fairly distributed outcomes, not on the process of arriving at those outcomes. See
id.
98. See Hari M. Osofsky et al., Environmental Justice and the BP Deepwater Horizon
Oil Spill, 20 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 99, 101, 110–27 (2012) (analyzing the amount of spill waste
and health impacts that disproportionately impacted socioeconomically disadvantaged or of
color communities).
99. See id. at 102.
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a larger category of release victims eases an already disproportionate
burden associated with the negative externalities from hazardous
substance industries.100 Expanded liability better distributes those risks,
minimizing the disparate impact. It also achieves victim equity, giving at
least the same damages to victims of non-oil hazardous releases as those
to which oil release victims are entitled.101
Expanded liability promotes victim access to the justice system. This
facilitates procedural justice by empowering those who otherwise lack
political power to tap into the justice system. Through access, these
groups can potentially change pollution-creating policies and
practices.102
Viewed through a corrective justice lens, there is a duty to repair
victim losses.103 As between victims of pollution and the polluter, the
costs of pollution should be born by the party creating the pollution
even if it extends liability or creates a greater burden on courts. Shifting
liability makes a strong statement that pollution is a wrong that must be
rectified.
C. Deterrence Benefits
One of tort law’s primary functions is deterring undesirable
conduct.104 “Legal theory suggests that when liability rules are narrow in
scope, categorically exclude certain forms of loss, and permit the spiller
to perfect various defenses, the spiller may not have sufficient incentives
to invest in prevention and safety.”105
But the actual deterrent effect that additional hazardous substance
liability may yield is arguably nominal or nonexistent.106 Entities that
deal in hazardous substances are already exposed to potentially largescale liability for such things as environmental remediation and loss
100. See id. at 194–95.
101. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Tort Law in the Era of Climate Change, Katrina,
and 9/11: Exploring Liability for Extraordinary Risks, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1075, 1125–26
(2009).
102. Procedural justice refers to procedurally equal treatment of “equal concern and
respect in the political decision about how . . . goods and opportunities are to be distributed.”
Kuehn, supra note 94, at 10688.
103. Id. at 10693 (“Corrective justice involves not only the just administration of
punishment to those who break the law, but also a duty to repair the losses for which one is
responsible.”).
104. Farber, supra note 101, at 1114.
105. Palmer, supra note 1, at 110.
106. Perry, supra note 7, at 17.
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accompanied by physical injury or property damage.107 Even if there is
some deterrent effect, the costs involved in shifting liability may
outweigh the additional deterrence.
Another concern is that allowing recovery for pure economic loss
could result in a liability shift for private loss, or “wealth transfers,” that
do not reflect true social costs.108 When liability shifts for private loss
rather than true social costs, there is a concern it will lead to overdeterrence.109 This can cause those who handle hazardous waste to
unduly invest in protective mechanisms and pass those costs along to
consumers:
According to economic theory, efficient deterrence requires
internalization of the social cost of every inefficient act by the
actor. In assessing social costs, it is important not to add private
losses that reflect “wealth transfers,” namely diminution of
personal wealth that generates corresponding gains to others.
Such gains do not mitigate the private loss, but cancel it out in
the calculation of the externalized social cost. Internalization of
private losses irrespective of the parallel gains may lead to overdeterrence. Arguably, many [pure] economic losses correspond
to resulting economic gains. If the competitors of an interrupted
business can easily increase their production during the
interruption at no cost beyond normal production costs, their
gain will offset the unfortunate business’ loss.110
Financial responsibility requirements like mandatory insurance to
cover liability risk have the potential to increase deterrence.111 Financial
requirements increase health and safety by internalizing the cost of
significant accident risks.112 Such requirements also reduce levels of
risky behavior by preventing insolvency as a way to externalize cost and
encouraging insurers to regulate risky activities as a precondition of

107. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–62 (2012) (OPA); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–92 (2012)
(Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); id. §§ 9601–28 (Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act).
108. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 5, at 13–14.
109. See, e.g., id.
110. Perry, supra note 7, at 16 (footnotes omitted).
111. Jeffrey Kehne, Note, Encouraging Safety Through Insurance-Based Incentives:
Financial Responsibility for Hazardous Wastes, 96 YALE L.J. 403, 405 (1986) (“Financial
responsibility provisions improve safety by preventing insolvency from undermining the
deterrent effects of liability rules.”).
112. See id. at 404–06.
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coverage.113
Insurers “encourage safety improvements . . . [by
conducting] risk assessments that precede the issuance or renewal of
policies, [selecting] premium schedules that categorize insured[]
[parties] based on differences in expected losses, and [utilizing] contract
provisions that require . . . specified safety practices.”114
D. Unlimited Liability and Over-Deterrence Concerns
The most widely invoked concern about expanding pure economic
damage recovery is that it exposes defendants to a potentially unlimited
scope of liability and may lead to over-deterrence.115
Without
mechanisms to limit liability, the “ripple effect” potential for openended claims is significant. One spill can implicate a seemingly limitless
number of claimants, including businesses, customers, creditors,
suppliers, employees, shareholders, and consumers near the spill locus
or around the globe. In spill situations, “where the number of victims is
not only uncertain ex ante but potentially enormous, where procedural
mechanisms reduce per capita cost of litigation thereby inducing victims
to sue, and where the defendant may be a deep-pocketed corporation,”
the potential for open-ended exposure is realistic.116 There is further
concern this could lead to disproportionate liability between the relative
culpability of the wrong and the amount of liability.117 At its core, the
pure economic loss exclusion is a proximate cause rule aimed at limiting
the scope of a defendant’s liability to avoid shifting costs for
unforeseeable damages or damages that are too remote from the harm
to justify the imposition of liability.118
Open-ended liability can burden responsible parties to the point of
insolvency. While there is a legitimate concern that catastrophic liability
might lead to insolvency, the bankruptcy laws do permit
reorganization.119 Also, catastrophic liability is itself a means of risk
spreading.120

113. Id.
114. Id. at 406.
115. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 101, at 1078; James, supra note 83, at 45; Perry, supra
note 7, at 12.
116. Perry, supra note 7, at 13.
117. Id. at 14; see also James, supra note 83, at 50.
118. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 5, at 27–30.
119. See Farber, supra note 101, at 1122–23.
120. Id. at 1122 (“If private firms have tort liability, the burden is put on the
shareholders and thereby spread through the securities markets. . . . To the extent that
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Moreover, when there are limited funds to compensate victims, the
result might be an inequitable distribution of those assets to the first
claimants, leaving arguably more legally deserving claimants without
compensation.121 Insolvent or low capitalized firms will pay the first
claimants, leaving other worthy victims with little or no recovery. The
scope of liability might entirely deter organizations from entering
markets that might otherwise be socially beneficial for them to engage
in.122
There are ways to provide certainty about the scope of liability.
Alternatives include damage caps, financial assurance provisions, and
proximate cause rules. Certainty permits those dealing in hazardous
substances to better prepare and insure contingencies.123 If the liability
potential is too uncertain and vast, insurers might stop offering coverage
or price the premium at a prohibitively high amount.124 This is
problematic because losses are not optimally spread.125
Damage caps are particularly effective at providing certainty as to
the scope of liability. For example, for offshore releases, OPA liability
is limited to $75 million plus all remedial costs, and for onshore facilities,
liability is limited to $350 million.126 In general, responsible parties are
liable without limit only if the incident resulted from gross negligence,
willful misconduct, a violation of operational safety regulations, or if the
responsible party fails to report the incident or cooperate with removal
activities.127
The success of a capped damage system depends upon whether the
cap is set at an amount that provides sufficient victim compensation and
encourages safety measures while avoiding open-ended liability. OPA’s
damage cap has been widely criticized for being an insufficient
compensation amount. For example, one commentator refers to this as
private insurers are in the market, the burden of covering catastrophic risks can be reduced if
they are allowed to subrogate to the tort claims of their insureds. In any event, to a much
greater extent than is true of more easily insurable risks, such as routine auto accidents or
house fires, the tort system’s ability to spread risks is a major advantage.”).
121. Some commentators posit that claimants with accompanying physical injury or
property damage have superior claims than those who suffer a purely economic loss. See, e.g.,
Perry, supra note 7, at 15.
122. Id. at 14–15.
123. Id. at 20.
124. Garrett, supra note 60, at 10176; Perry, supra note 7, at 15.
125. Perry, supra note 7, at 15.
126. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a) (2012).
127. Id. § 2704(c).
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a figure “so paltry in relation to the potential costs of oil spills that,
arguably, it would produce less safety than the old [pure economic loss]
exclusionary rule.”128 When the cap is too low to satisfy victim loss, it
provides insufficient compensation and creates equity problems because
the earliest claimants may possibly tap the limit of the cap, leaving
otherwise worthy victims without recourse.
Financial assurance provisions, too, provide certainty. The costs of
increased liability can be spread through private or public insurance.
Financial responsibility provisions can be included that require firms to
post bonds or maintain sufficient insurance to cover the damage cap
amount.129 When done in tandem with damage caps, there is a
reasonable degree of certainty about the extent of liability. In turn, this
provides insurers with a more accurate ability to assess the level of risk
and needed investment in safety measures.130
Proximate cause rules also provide a level of certainty. For example,
liability can be expanded only to those victims who have a right to put
the injured resource to commercial use.131 Another possibility is to
expand liability only for victims that the defendant should have foreseen
would incur economic loss.132 Further limitations can be placed on the
types of hazardous substance releases that shift liability.133 Also,
threshold minimum release quantities can be established to limit
liability.134
In the context of oil releases, scholarly disagreement exists about the
extent to which OPA contains proximate cause limitations on the class

128. Palmer, supra note 1, at 111; see also Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The
BP Oil Spill Settlement and the Paradox of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397, 399–400
(2014) (referring to OPA’s cap as “almost quaint”). Note that a 2012 report by the
Department of Homeland Security reflects that OPA’s $75 million dollar statutory cap has
been exceeded once for an offshore facility with the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon and
Macondo Well; once for an onshore facility with the Enbridge Pipeline release; and fifty-nine
times from offshore vessels. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIL POLLUTION ACT
LIABILITY LIMITS IN 2012, at iii (2012), available at www.uscg.mil/npfc/docs/PDFs/Reports/Li
ability_Limits_Report_2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/J5S6-KE8G.
129. See Kehne, supra note 111, at 403.
130. See id. at 410.
131. See Goldberg, supra note 31, at 337.
132. See Clark, supra note 3, 549–53.
133. See Clark, supra note 3, at 549.
134. Cf. A&W Smelter & Refiners, Inc. v. Clinton, 146 F.3d 1107, 1110–11 (9th
Cir. 1998).
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of claimants entitled to recover pure economic damages.135 In OPA’s
broadest reading, “any claimant” may recover pure economic lost
profits or earnings upon proving (i) the victim incurred economic loss,
and (ii) that “but for” the release the victim’s economic loss would not
have occurred.136 This reading would permit recovery by claimants far
removed from where the release actually occurred.137
Kenneth Feinberg appears to have required a showing of proximate
causation in order to receive interim payments from the Gulf Coast
Claims Facility (GCCF) in response to the 2010 Gulf oil spill.138
However, the claims paid were generally expansive. For example,
compensated GCCF claimants included hotels, restaurants, real estate
agents and developers, retail businesses, builders, contractors, doctors,
veterinarians, small and large businesses, and individuals living
paycheck to paycheck, unable to rely on savings to get by while claims
were being processed.139
John C.P. Goldberg argues that OPA is proximally limited to
situations where claimants can prove that their economic loss was
caused because the spill “has damaged, destroyed or otherwise rendered
physically unavailable to them property or resources that they have a
right to put to commercial use.”140 Vernon Valentine Palmer, on the
other hand, argues that OPA does not contain a proximate cause
limitation.141 Rather, he argues OPA contains only “a unitary cause-infact analysis” coupled with the question of whether the economic loss
falls within the intended scope and purpose of OPA.142 Limitation on
liability, he posits, is accomplished through OPA’s damage cap.143
135. Compare Goldberg, supra note 31, and Davis, supra note 5, at 27–30, with Palmer,
supra note 1, 136–38.
136. See Goldberg, supra note 31, at 349.
137. See id. at 346–48 (citing examples).
138. BDO CONSULTING, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE GULF COAST CLAIMS
FACILITY REPORT OF FINDINGS & OBSERVATIONS TO THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
38 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/66520126611210351178.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/FKB3-AUCT. The GCCF claims eligibility criteria reflect that
some attention was paid to issues of proximity to the locus of events. See Palmer, supra note
1, at 113 n.42.
139. BDO CONSULTING, supra note 138, at 47.
140. Goldberg, supra note 31, at 337 (emphasis added). Ultimately, the GCCF did not
adopt this approach, opting instead for a more expansive, claimant-favorable approach to
proximate cause. BDO CONSULTING, supra note 138, at 39 n.25.
141. Palmer, supra note 1, at 136–37.
142. Id. at 137.
143. Id. at 138.
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OPA’s lack of clarity about the extent to which there are proximate
cause limitations diminishes the benefits that greater clarity can provide.
As much as possible, an effective system should provide clarity about
the scope of liability.
E. Judicial Manageability Concerns
Another concern about expanding liability to cover pure economic
loss is that it invites a flood of litigation that can overwhelm the court
system. Mass tort liability like that associated with asbestos exposure
requires a meaningful investment of judicial time and resources; it is
appropriate to think of the implications of expanding pure economic
loss recovery with the lessons from mass tort litigation in mind.144
While there are rightly concerns about judicial manageability, there
are numerous potential mechanisms that can increase judicial
effectiveness in handling voluminous cases.145 Procedural devices like
consolidation and class action, improvements in civil procedure, moving
compensation from the judiciary to an administrative agency, and
placing some limits on the degree to which liability rules are expanded
are all vehicles to increase judicial manageability.146
IV. INTERIM PAYMENTS: BENEFITS AND CONCERNS
Interim payments, too, advance a number of tort remedy goals.
They provide faster, fuller, and fairer victim compensation. They also
further environmental justice. A proper structure advances these goals
while responding to due process and judicial manageability concerns.
A. Compensation Benefits and Litigation-Related Trauma
Interim payments facilitate more expeditious recovery that avoids at
least some of the harm that victims incur when they are forced to bear
the cost of their injuries. The shorter the period of time that victims
front the expense of their loss, the better positioned they are to avoid
further costs. Some victims do not have the money or are placed in
severe financial difficulty by the cost of their harm. Without interim

144. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 101, at 1104–07 (discussing the consequences of mass
torts like asbestos litigation on the legal system).
145. Id. at 1106 (quoting AM. BAR ASS’N, RULE OF LAW IN TIMES OF MAJOR
DISASTER 6 (2007), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_
build/litigation/rol_disaster.authcheckdam.pdf), archived at http://perma.cc/88SJ-VGZ2.
146. See id. at 1127–28; Perry, supra note 7, at 14.
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funding, some victims will not be financially positioned to make sound
health and lifestyle choices.
Moreover, faster recovery potentially mitigates, although it might
not fully alleviate, the amount of stressful entanglement a victim has
with the litigation system. Because interim payments provide early reshifting of the costs of hazardous release injuries, they minimize the
amount of economic loss suffered and also mitigate a secondary type of
harm social scientists describe as “litigation-related trauma.”147
Litigation-related trauma refers to the harm litigants experience as a
result of their exposure to the legal process.148 That trauma involves a
variety of harmful effects correlated with a victim’s stressful interaction
with and exposure to adversarial litigation. Litigation-related trauma
causes litigants to experience a variety of symptoms that in some
instances mimic Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), including
anxiety, sleeplessness, depression, obsessive fixation on litigation, panic
attack, stress, and fear.149 While all litigants experience a diverse array
of perceptions and feelings about litigation, as a general matter,
litigation tends to involve some degree of litigation-related trauma.150

147. Scholarship reflects such classification labels as “Litigation Response Syndrome,”
and “Forensic Stress Disorder,” characterized by anxiety, depression, and stress. See, e.g.,
Larry J. Cohen & Joyce H. Vesper, Forensic Stress Disorder, 25 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1
(2001) (discussing Forensic Stress Disorder); Paul R. Lees-Haley, Litigation Response
Syndrome: How Stress Confuses the Issues, 56 DEF. COUNS. J. 110 (1989) (discussing
Litigation Response Syndrome); Tamara Relis, Civil Litigation from Litigants’ Perspectives:
What We Know and What We Don’t Know About the Litigation Experience of Individual
Litigants, 25 STUD. L., POL. & SOC’Y, 151, 179–82 (2002) (discussing litigant anxiety).
148. Marvin H. Firestone & Robert I. Simon, Intimacy Verses Advocacy: Attorney–
Client Sex, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 679, 684 (1992) (“The legal client often experiences significant
psychological stress during the litigation process. Some litigants become so distressed that
they are rendered dysfunctional. Symptoms of anxiety, depression, and other manifestations
of mental disorders occur. A Litigation Response Syndrome (LRS) has been described [as a
response to] the stress of being involved in litigation. Anxiety and depression are the most
common manifestations. Such symptoms may interfere with the capacity of these litigants to
act appropriately in their own interests and cause them to rely excessively on their attorneys
for guidance.” (footnote omitted)).
149. See, e.g., Cohen & Vesper, supra note 147, at 3–4; Firestone & Simon, supra note
148, at 684; Lees-Haley, supra note 147, at 112.
150. See Relis, supra note 147, at 153 (“Undeniably, litigants are hugely diverse in every
conceivable respect including their perceptions and feelings. . . . For some, litigation will be
nothing new, whereas for others it will have great emotional significance. . . . But throughout
the findings lies a common thread.”).
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Social scientists explain that hazardous release victims who become
litigants are particularly vulnerable to litigation-related trauma.151
Social scientists studying the psychological impact of litigation-related
trauma on the victims of the Exxon Valdez oil spill found strong
empirical evidence that those victims suffered particularly acute
litigation-related trauma.152 Their initial spill-related trauma led to a
second type of trauma—litigation stress—associated with adversarial
litigation, trying to understand complex legal issues and recurrent
thoughts about the spill.153
Delay contributes to or compounds litigation-related injury.154
“Delay has significant negative effects on claimants (even ‘successful
claimants’ who eventually prevail) and society.”155 Prolonged exposure
to litigation lengthens exposure to this stress-inducing trigger, thus
potentially compounding this psychological injury.
Interim payments have the potential to mitigate litigation-related
injury by minimizing the length of victim exposure to litigation and by
providing expedited financial compensation that can reduce the amount
of the victim’s general financial anxiety. It reduces the amount of time

151. See Lewis Robert Shreve, Note, Lessons from Exxon-Valdez: Employing Market
Forces to Minimize the Psychological Impact on Oil Spill Plaintiffs, 35 LAW & PSYCHOL.
REV. 239, 243 (2011) (“When litigation is in response to a major disaster, its psychological
effects can be more severe, often significantly worsening the plights of these plaintiffs.”); see
also J. Steven Picou, Brent K. Marshall & Duane A. Gill, Disaster, Litigation, and the
Corrosive Community, 82 SOC. FORCES 1493, 1498 (2004). Spill disaster victims experience
two discrete harmful events. Both the primary spill trauma and the secondary litigationrelated trauma create qualitative and quantitative harm to spill victims. See Brent K.
Marshall, J. Steven Picou & Jan R. Schlichtmann, Technological Disasters, Litigation Stress,
and the Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 26 LAW & POL’Y 289, 291–98
(2004); Shreve, supra (applying literature on litigation-related psychological harm to the Gulf
oil spill context and advocating for a wider use of market-valuation of claims to minimize
injury).
152. Picou et al., supra note 151, at 1497, 1514; Shreve, supra note 151, at 243.
153. See Picou, supra note 40, at 80; Picou et al., supra note 151, at 1515 (“Our findings
suggest that the legal system itself can become a secondary disaster, exacerbating and
prolonging psychological stress and perceived community damage. Indeed, as technological
disasters increase and as natural disasters increasingly are viewed as human caused, the legal
system in an already litigious society will play an even more prominent role in postdisaster
damage awards.”).
154. See Relis, supra note 147, at 170 (“Though few empirical examples exist to prove
that delays actually result in injustice, what is known is that delays are and have historically
been common reasons for litigants’ distress.”); see also Daniel W. Shuman, When Time Does
Not Heal: Understanding the Importance of Avoiding Unnecessary Delay in the Resolution of
Tort Cases, 6 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 880, 881 (2000).
155. See Shuman, supra note 154, at 882.
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in which victims need to outlay or borrow funds during the injury
period. This minimizes interest payments victims make on borrowed
funds, penalties paid if unable to make payments, and any attendant
negative credit impact. In turn, it maximizes the extent to which victims
can invest and realize a return on their own funds. While interim
payments might not expedite final resolution of litigation, they can
alleviate some of the stress associated with delayed claims payment.
B. Environmental Justice Benefits and the Story of the 2010 Gulf Oil
Spill Interim Payment Process
As discussed in Part II, hazardous releases and attendant protracted
litigation can have particularly pronounced impact on socioeconomically
disadvantaged populations and persons of color.156 Long delays between
harm and compensation further injure these already-burdened
victims.157
In addition to economic harm, release victims also face stigma and
discrimination. Social scientists Johan M. Havenaar and Wim van den
Brink describe the social rejection and discrimination that victims of
toxicological disasters experience:
Victims of toxicological disasters may suffer from discrimination,
as though they were carriers of some mysterious and noxious
[contagion]. Lifton described how survivors of the nuclear
bombings of Hiroshima, the so called “Hibakusha,” suffered
from discrimination, for example as marriage candidates. Social
rejection and discrimination of evacuees and inhabitants from
contaminated regions has been reported following many
toxicological events, for example, after the Seveso accident, the
Love Canal crisis, and in victims exposed to asbestos and
pesticides.158
Social scientist J. Steven Picou focused on a variant of this
phenomenon known as the “corrosive community.”159 The corrosive
156. See generally Osofsky et al., supra note 98, at 149–50.
157. Id. (“To the extent that plaintiffs who are low-income or persons of color win
monetary settlements or at trial, this compensation may alleviate some harms incurred by the
BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. On the other hand, long delays and eventual losses may
strain an already-burdened population.”).
158. Johan M. Havenaar & Wim van den Brink, Psychological Factors Affecting Health
After Toxicological Disasters, 17 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 359, 362 (1997) (citations
omitted).
159. Picou, supra note 40, at 79–80.
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community relates to certain characteristics displayed in communities
affected by hazardous releases, such as “a loss of trust in civic
institutions, social isolation, group conflict, mental health problems,
deteriorating social relationships, and . . . ‘corrosive social cycles.’”160
Providing early compensatory funds shifts money toward, not from,
already-stigmatized communities. This can help mitigate some of the
corrosive community effects in the aftermath of release disasters.
Interim payments promote the goals of environmental justice by
expediting payment to a wider category of victims, including groups or
communities that are disproportionately impacted by environmental
harm and that are most in need of expedited compensation. To the
extent victims are socioeconomically disadvantaged, they are most in
need of timely interim financial compensation. Early compensation
better positions victims to make sound health and lifestyle choices
because they will not be forced to bear the costs of the harm for lengthy
periods of time.
Also, interim payments further procedural justice goals because
early funding facilitates victim access to the justice system without
foreclosing a victim’s ability to obtain complete judicial relief.161 This
empowers victims to possibly affect policy change through active
litigation.
The 2010 Gulf oil spill presented an opportunity to observe a mass
interim claims payment process and draw environmental justice lessons
from that experience. BP’s interim claims payment obligations for the
2010 spill derived from OPA.162
Immediately after the well blowout, BP began processing interim
damage claims.163 Initially, BP began processing such claims in house.
BP set up 35 field offices in the Gulf region, received over 154,000
160. Id.; see also J. Steven Picou, Toxins in the Environment, Damage to the Community:
Sociology and the Toxic Tort, in WITNESSING FOR SOCIOLOGY: SOCIOLOGISTS IN COURT
211, 213–14 (Pamela J. Jenkins & Steve Kroll-Smith eds., 1996) (“Substantial sociological
evidence exists to suggest that toxins in the environment contaminate more than air, water, or
soil; they also damage the social fabric of a community, its neighborhoods, its families, and its
residents’ self-esteem. Environmental contamination, in short, is often both a biospheric and
a sociological disaster.”).
161. See 33 U.S.C. § 2705(a) (2012).
162. See id. (“The responsible party shall establish a procedure for the payment or
settlement of claims for interim, short-term damages.”).
163. See BDO CONSULTING, supra note 138, at 12 (describing how BP began paying
interim compensation thirteen days after the explosion). See supra Part I for further
background information about the 2010 Gulf oil spill.
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claims, and paid 127,000 payments.164 From May 3, 2010, to August 22,
2010, BP paid over $399 million to claimants.165
A little over three months after the spill, BP established and utilized
a more formal claims processing facility called the GCCF.166 The GCCF
was created under unique circumstances. It resulted from a private
negotiation between BP executives, President Obama, and other key
members of the Obama Administration.167 After the meeting, BP
acknowledged it was a responsible party under OPA.168 BP agreed to
place $20 billion into a trust fund to establish the GCCF to fulfill BP’s
legal obligations.169 This was well over OPA’s $75 million liability cap
that many were concerned BP would invoke to limit its liability for the
release.170 To “assure independence” from BP, the White House
secured Kenneth Feinberg—a well-respected and seasoned mass claims
processing executive—to administer the GCCF.171
The GCCF, at least in theory, was an expedited, procedurally more
accessible, and lower cost damage recovery alternative to litigation.172
In the GCCF, claimants could obtain prompt payment and avoid filing
or litigation fees.173 While claimants could—and many did—hire
attorneys, professional fees were typically lower than litigation costs to
164. BDO CONSULTING, supra note 138, at 12.
165. Id.
166. The GCCF operated from August 2010 until it was closed in June 2012.
FEINBERG, supra note 26, at 159; Important Announcement, GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY,
http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/
G264-4PU8.
167. This was later referred to as a “woodshed lecture.” FEINBERG, supra note 26, at
129. Kenneth Feinberg described the novelty as follows:
Nothing like this had ever occurred in American history. There was no new statute,
no congressional hearings, no official administrative regulations, no court order—
just a private agreement orchestrated by the president to be implemented by BP and
monitored by the Department of Justice. An escrow agreement signed by BP and
the department would formalize the commitment. One of the world’s giant oil
companies simply agreed to enter the claims compensation business.
Id.
168. See Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the President After Meeting with BP
Executives, WHITE HOUSE (June 16, 2010, 2:25 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/statement-president-after-meeting-with-bp-executives, archived at http://perma.cc/U7M
C-K8XZ.
169. Id.
170. Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 128, at 399–400.
171. Office of the Press Sec’y, supra note 168.
172. Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 128, at 398.
173. See id.
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reflect the decreased professional effort and risk involved in bringing a
claim in the GCCF.174 Moreover, bringing a claim in the GCCF was a
no-risk alternative to litigation because claimants could obtain interim
relief and still file a lawsuit for claims that were not available in the
GCCF such as punitive damages.175
The GCCF offered claimants a menu of payment options that took
place in two discrete phases. In Phase I, the GCCF began paying
“Emergency Advance Payments” for the loss of “earnings or profits,
removal and clean-up costs, real or personal property damage, loss of
subsistence use of natural resources and physical injury or death caused
by the Spill by submitting a lesser level of documentation than would be
required in Phase II”176 During Phase II, the GCCF offered three
options: (i) “interim payments” designed to compensate claimants for
past losses, (ii) final payments designed to compensate claimants for
past and future losses, and (iii) a “Quick Pay” cash out that was more
streamlined and required less documentary support to substantiate a
claim.177

174. See D. Theodore Rave, Settlement, ADR, and Class Action Superiority, 5 J. TORT.
L. 91, 119 (2012).
175. OPA further clarifies that when the responsible party publicly advertises its
designation, it also includes in that advertisement notice to claimants that interim payment
shall not preclude recovery for the remainder of the claimant’s unpaid damages, 33 U.S.C.
§ 2714(b)(2) (2012), and that claimants are protected in their ability to seek any unpaid
damages or any other damages allowed by law beyond those recoverable in OPA.
Id. § 2715(b)(2) (“Payment of such a claim shall not foreclose a claimant’s right to recovery of
all damages to which the claimant otherwise is entitled under this Act or under any other
law.”); id. § 2705(a) (“Payment or settlement of a claim for interim, short-term damages
representing less than the full amount of damages to which the claimant ultimately may be
entitled shall not preclude recovery by the claimant for damages not reflected in the paid or
settled partial claim.”).
176. BDO CONSULTING, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE GULF COAST CLAIMS
FACILITY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resour
ces/697201241917226179477.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/AB7J-6W3S. Phase I began
almost immediately upon the start of the GCCF on August 23, 2010, and concluded on
November 23, 2010. FEINBERG, supra note 26, at 159.
177. BDO CONSULTING, supra note 138, 34–35.
As a general matter, the GCCF subjected claims filed during Phase II to more
stringent documentation requirements than those applied . . . during Phase I . . . .
[A]t the same time, it expanded the types of businesses . . . eligible for compensation
and granted automatic eligibility to claimants . . . involved in businesses that were
particularly reliant upon Gulf resources . . . .
BDO CONSULTING, supra note 176, at 3.
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Many GCCF claimants did not select the interim payment method,
opting instead for either the quick or final settlement options.178 Both
the quick and final pay options were final settlements. Claimants were
required to waive their future right to sue BP in order to obtain
payment.179 Feinberg explained that phenomenon as follows:
[C]laimants want closure. It is unsettling and troublesome to be
reminded over and over again about tragedy. So although
thousands of claimants would opt for an interim payment, many
thousands more would decide to move on, close the oil spill
chapter, and look to the future. The choice was theirs.”180
The GCCF was widely publicized as independent.181 The implication
was that independent referred to structural autonomy from BP.182
Unlike a PRP-led interim claims process, the GCCF actively marketed
itself as autonomous.183 That independence, combined with Feinberg’s
gravitas, imbued the GCCF with a more credible ability to assess
damage claims than a BP-led claims process.184
Attorneys in the multi-district litigation (MDL), however, argued
that the GCCF was not truly autonomous but, rather, linked to BP.185
They argued that the independent branding mislead GCCF claimants,
who might have thought they were dealing with a fully independent
entity when claimants settled their claims and waived their future right
178.
179.
180.
181.

FEINBERG, supra note 26, at 167–71.
Id. at 168, 171.
Id. at 171.
See, e.g., Office of the Press Sec’y, FACT SHEET: Claims and Escrow, WHITE
HOUSE (June 16, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/fact-sheet-claims-andescrow, archived at http://perma.cc/3F2L-VR6F (“Independent Claims Facility[:] A new,
independent claims process will be created with the mandate to be fairer, faster, and more
transparent in paying damage claims by individuals and businesses. To assure independence,
Kenneth Feinberg, who previously administered the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund, will serve as the independent claims administrator. . . . Escrow Account[:] BP has
agreed to contribute $20 billion over a four-year period at a rate of $5 billion per year,
including $5 billion within 2010. BP will provide assurance for these commitments by setting
aside $20 billion in U.S. assets.” (capitalization omitted)).
182. See Office of the Press Sec’y, supra note 168.
183. GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY: FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2011), http://www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/imported_pdfs/l
ibrary/assets/gccf-faqs.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/PMZ5-RSYW; see also FEINBERG,
supra note 26, at 143–44.
184. See FEINBERG, supra note 26, at 144.
185. See Order and Reasons at 2–3, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,”
MDL No. 2179, 2011 WL 323866, at *1–2 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011), ECF No. 1098; see also In re
Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 946 (E.D. La. 2012).
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to sue BP.186 The MDL transferee Judge Carl Barbier agreed and held
that, while Feinberg might independently evaluate the merits of claims,
the GCCF and Feinberg were not neutral or independent of BP.187
After settlement negotiations, BP agreed to pay about $7.8 billion
for remaining economic claims.188 The GCCF closed its doors and a
court-supervised successor entity administered by Pat Juneau began
operations in its stead.189 BP, in turn, continued to process claims for
any claimants who wished to deal directly with BP.190
From an environmental justice standpoint, the GCCF lacked an
essential element of procedural fairness because of its failure to
transparently disclose all BP ties. Because of its blended interim and
final payment incentives, it served more as a claims resolution facility
than one limited to interim claims processing. This was problematic,
particularly for those claimants who were socioeconomically vulnerable
and in need of immediate funds. It is difficult to assess whether all of
those claimants would have finally resolved their claims in the GCCF,
waiving future right to sue, if they had fully understood the linkage
between BP and the GCCF and known that they could potentially join
the MDL class action lawsuit. In other words, did they truly “want
closure” as explained by Feinberg, or were they drawn to the dangling
carrot of immediate, easy, higher, and available payout? While one can
only guess at the answer, it is certainly conceivable that at least some of
the claims can be explained in the latter fashion.
To best comport with procedural justice, interim claims processes
should have adequate safeguards to protect a victim’s ability to obtain
complete relief and to understand the material affiliations of the parties
with whom they are negotiating. This is critical when interim claims
processing is combined with final claims resolution.
But in many other ways, the GCCF was a remarkable success.
GCCF interim claims processing was significantly faster than litigation
186. See Order and Reasons, supra note 185, at 2–3.
187. Id. at 8–11. The court held that this lack of transparency led to a misunderstanding
by claimants, particularly by the claimants unrepresented by counsel, and ordered certain
corrective measures such as requiring Feinberg, his law firm, and the GCCF to refrain from
self-referencing as “independent” or “neutral,” and to disclose in all communications that
they were acting on behalf of BP. Id. at 12–14.
188. Campbell Robertson & John Schwartz, How a Gulf Settlement that BP Once
Hailed Has Become Its Target, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2014, at A1.
189. See In re Oil Spill, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 904–05.
190. Claims, BP, http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/gulf-of-mexico-restoration/clai
ms-information.html (last visited June 5, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/8NS7-Q5E4.
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in terms of its ability to intake, process, and deliver short-term damage
payments to claimants. Consider that, during the one and one-half years
of GCCF operations, the facility paid over $6.2 billion to claimants.191
The number of claims processed was enormous. Over 1 million claims
were processed to over 220,000 individuals and businesses.192 Money
flowed to victims almost immediately.193 In its second full month of
operation, it paid over $840 million in emergency advance payments.194
That is over $27 million per day.195 Most of those claims were for
economic injury, not property damage.196 Lost earnings or profits
constituted 90.3% of the claims received, 96.8% of the amounts paid,
and 99.8% of the claims paid.197 It was not until the attorneys in the
MDL took over the settlement process that litigation resulted in money
flow to victims. While it was not without flaws, in terms of overall
immediate money flow to compensate victims of documented damages,
interim claims processing in the GCCF worked.
C. Due Process Concerns
Interim relief implicates issues of procedural and substantive due
process. Because interim relief is by definition expeditious and
provisional, defendants are concerned that payment prior to
adjudication unfairly deprives them of due process of law.198 After all, if
a defendant who has paid interim damages ultimately succeeds on the
merits of a claim or defense, the defendant will have been made to pay
damages unnecessarily.199 While the losing party may be forced to repay
interim damages that are improperly awarded, this recoupment may not
be feasible if the claimant is judgment proof or if the cost of seeking
recoupment outweighs the likelihood of collection. Defendants may
also find themselves without recourse to seek contribution because
other parties do not exist, have not been identified, or successfully

191. BDO CONSULTING, supra note 176, at 8.
192. Id.
193. See id. at 1.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Palmer, supra note 1, at 109.
197. BDO CONSULTING, supra note 138, at 4.
198. See, e.g., Trustees of the Tampa Maritime Ass’n–Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n
Pension Plan & Trust v. S.E.L. Maduro (Fla.), Inc., 849 F. Supp. 1535, 1538 (M.D. Fla. 1994);
Robbins v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 636 F. Supp. 641, 677–78 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
199. Cf. Sisk, supra note 35, at 121–23.
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contest liability. Thus, as a practical matter, the defendant may never be
able to recapture improperly paid interim damages.
One possible response is to limit recovery for interim damages to
situations in which defendants are strictly liable for releases. This
ensures that defendants pay interim damages where there is a strong
case that the defendants have a legal obligation to pay. This would
create a strict liability compensation scheme for private parties and
provide a mechanism for interim recovery—the approach that Congress
took in OPA.200 There are only three defenses under OPA, and thus, as
a practical matter, responsible parties have little basis for denying
liability.201
While interim damages could be imposed for negligence, such faultbased claims involve complex issues of reasonableness of behavior that
cloud liability obligations. And, although interim damages could be
awarded upon a showing of a likelihood of success on the merits,
requiring such an individualized showing greatly complicates the judicial
burden, potentially outweighing the benefits of the device. Moreover, it
increases the chances of improper payment of interim damages.
Another response to due process concerns is to limit interim
payments to situations where there is a readily identifiable responsible
party.202 As a practical matter, this limits the number of releases that
will be suitable for interim payments because many releases are
discovered that have weak or no factual traceability to an identified

200. See Palmer, supra note 1, at 137–38.
201. The defenses are an act of God, an act of war, or an act solely attributable to the
negligence of a third party with whom the responsible party is not in a contractual
relationship. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012). Note, too, that even in situations where a
responsible party alleges the discharge was caused by a third party act or omission, OPA
requires the responsible party to pay the claimant’s damages and then provides the
responsible party the right to seek indemnity from that third party. See id § 2702(d)(1)(B).
202. In OPA, the obligation to provide interim payments is triggered in situations when
the oil release is traceable to an identifiable responsible party, typically the owner or operator
of a vessel or the terminal from which the substance is emanating. See 33 U.S.C. § 2714(a).
The President designates a “responsible party,” at which point the responsible party has five
days to contest the designation. Id. § 2714(a) (“When the President receives information of
an incident, the President shall, where possible and appropriate, designate the source or
sources of the discharge . . . .”); id. § 2714(b)(1) (“If a responsible party or guarantor fails to
inform the President, within 5 days after receiving notification of designation . . . , such party
. . . shall advertise the designation . . . .”). Once officially designated, then the responsible
party must advertise its status, pay to clean up the release, and pay damages up to the limit of
its liability. See id. §§ 2704(a), 2714(b).
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party.203 There are far stronger due process concerns about imposing
liability when there is a weak nexus between the defendant and the
release. Limiting interim claims payments to situations where there is
an identified party responsible for the contamination source addresses
these concerns.
To be protective of defendant’s due process concerns, payment of
interim damages should not compromise a defendant’s ability to fully
litigate available claims or defenses. The legislature can include a
provision clarifying that any interim payments made to claimants before
a final disposition of a defendant’s liability is not an admission of
liability nor does it prejudice the responsible party’s ability to prosecute
any right, claim, or defense.204
D. Judicial Manageability Concerns
If the interim payments require judicial action, there is a concern
that the time and resources required to evaluate each individual claim,
address arguments over documentation, and handle appeals will be
costly and overwhelming.205 It can be extremely expensive to handle
small, individual claims, review documentary support, and secure any
necessary expert assistance.206
Interim payment does not need to be handled by the judiciary,
however. Payments can be processed privately by the responsible party,
a third party, or by a delegated executive agency.207 By incentivizing

203. See Jason Scott Johnston, Is the Polluter Pays Principle Really Fundamental? An
Economic Explanation of the Relative Unimportance of Environmental Liability and Taxes in
US Environmental Law, in MARITIME POLLUTION LIABILITY AND POLICY: CHINA, EUROPE
AND THE US 111, 116 (Michael G. Faure, Han Lixon & Shan Hongjun, eds., 2010).
204. See generally MD. CODE ANN., Insurance § 19-104 (LexisNexis 2011) (Maryland
Insurance Code, Health Care Malpractice Insurance); 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 532 (2008)
(discussing how tender of payment may be an admission of liability and discussing statutes
prohibiting admission of advance payments as evidence of admission of liability).
205. See FEINBERG, supra note 26, at 131–32.
206. J. David Prince, Compensation for Victims of Hazardous Substance Exposure, 11
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 657, 700 (1985).
207. See Farber, supra note 101, at 1124 (“The desirability of compensation does not
necessarily mean that a judicial forum is optimal. A legislatively established administrative
system might offer several advantages over courts. It could operate under a more
comprehensive set of rules. Transaction costs could be lower because agency expertise would
produce more efficient decisions. It might also be easier for an agency to produce
standardized protocols and payment schedules, which would also simplify the adjudicatory
process.” (footnote omitted)).
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private payments, concerns about manageability are minimized. Courts
are generally not involved.
OPA accomplishes this by utilizing financial incentives that
encourage responsible parties to promptly and privately pay
documented interim damages. OPA contains an interest penalty if a
responsible party does not expeditiously pay claims.208 Specifically, the
responsible party is liable for interest beginning on the thirtieth day
following presentment up to the date on which the responsible party
pays the claim.209 Prejudgment interest furthers the goal of complete
compensation by awarding damages for the lost use of funds, including
the opportunity to invest and earn interest from the time of the release
to the time of judgment.210 OPA removes incentives for defendants to
delay settlement by compounding damages that are not fully satisfied
within ninety days.211 The statute permits parties who do not have their
claims fully satisfied or settled within ninety days to elect to either
litigate against the responsible party or to recover the amount of their
unsatisfied claim from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF).212 If
the OSLTF pays a claim, the OSLTF can then seek recoupment of that
amount from the responsible party, along with interest, administrative
costs, and attorney’s fees.213 Under this structure, delay causes further
damages to accrue, the liability for which encourages responsible parties
to provide prompt compensation. Under OPA, recalcitrance does not
pay.

208. 33 U.S.C. § 2705(b)(1) (2012) (stating that OPA requires a responsible party to pay
interest on claims “beginning on the 30th day following the date on which the claim is
presented”). Interest penalties are built into other damage schemes to facilitate prompt
payment. For example, state laws governing vehicular insurance coverage include interim
payment structures encouraged by interest penalties. See Micah J. Penn, 2006 Survey of
Rhode Island Law Cases, Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. Barry,
892 A.2d 915 (R.I. 2006), 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 618, 620 (2007).
209. 33 U.S.C. § 2705(b)(1).
210. Dean Richard, Note, “An Award Fit for Alice in Wonderland”—Texas Allows
Prejudgment Interest on Future Damages: C&H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson, 37 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. 149 (Nov. 24, 1993), 25 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 955, 959, 980 (1994).
211. See 33 U.S.C. § 2713(c)(2) (“If a claim is presented in accordance with subsection
(a) of this section and . . . the claim is not settled by any person by payment within 90 days
. . . , the claimant may elect to commence an action in court against the responsible party or
guarantor or to present the claim to the Fund.”).
212. Id.
213. Id. § 2715(c) (“[A]ction[s] on behalf of the Fund [will include] interest (including
prejudgment interest), administrative and adjudicative costs, and attorney’s fees.”).
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Without legislative encouragement, there is little incentive for a
party to voluntarily pay interim damages.
It is economically
advantageous to the responsible party to delay resolution of the damage
award and often in a defendant’s best interest to zealously litigate
outstanding questions of liability, damages, and contribution.
V. CONCLUSION
One of the fundamental roles of government is to facilitate the
availability of compensation in the event of a disaster.214 As a
component of this role, governments should create enforceable tort
rights where necessary against those who cause man-made disasters to
achieve justifiable compensation for victims.215 This is particularly true
for hazardous substance releases, which have the potential to create
mass harms, sometimes transforming the harm into a larger, arguably
“quasi-public,” disaster.216
Expanding private victim recovery to include pure economic loss
and permitting recovery on an interim basis achieves more full and fair
compensation, promotes environmental justice, encourages safe
practices and behaviors, and avoids undue litigation-related stress.
Without interim payments and pure economic damage recovery, there is
a problematic compensation gap. Many hazardous releases damage
public resources like water and air. Because many victims did not
experience private physical or personal property harm, the pure
economic loss rule effectively bars them from recompense. Yet, those
victims suffered economic loss. In some instances, that loss can be
catastrophic.
Limited exceptions exist permitting recovery for commercial
fisherman, family members, and victims of oil releases, but those
exceptions are not sufficiently broad to cover the full gamut of victims
who should recover. Even when pure economic loss is recoverable as a
consequence of physical or property injury, there is a problematic delay
in compensating private victims that further compounds their harm.
On the other hand, interim payments and pure economic damages
raise concerns. The most widely recited fear is of open-ended liability

214. See Sugarman, supra note 85, at 14.
215. See id.
216. See Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 128, at 401 (Man-made disasters have the
potential to create mass harms which “take on the quality of public law litigation, even if
played out in thousands of claims for public recompense.” (footnote omitted)).
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that will cause insolvency and industry exodus, make insurance difficult
or too pricey to obtain, or cause firms to overspend on deterrence
measures that they pass onto consumers.217
Because these damage mechanisms provide just, equitable, and fair
compensation, and advance tort goals, concerns such as the fear of
open-ended liability, while important to consider, need not defeat the
endeavor. As a policy matter, these concerns raise important issues that
need to be addressed in the ultimate design of a system that facilitates
interim payments and pure economic damage recovery. Damage caps,
in tandem with financial assurance requirements, for example, although
imperfect vehicles to fully compensate all victims, provide a policy
compromise that balances expanded compensation with limitations on
the scope of liability. Other devices, including proximate cause rules
and limitations on the type and amount of releases to trigger recovery,
serve to provide a measure of certainty about the scope of liability.
Imposing interim damage liability only in strict liability situations where
there is a readily identifiable responsible party mitigates due process
concerns and lessons the judicial burden.
“In tort law, ‘big’ is not necessarily ‘bad.’ The scale of litigation is
not by itself a reason for courts to flinch.”218 When the goal is
worthwhile, it is a question of how, not whether, to structure the system.

217. Perry, supra note 7, at 14–16.
218. Farber, supra note 101, at 1128.

